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IN THE COURT O* APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
I 'laintiffi Appellee, 
v ., 
MICHAEL WILLAM KISSELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20081065 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
J U R 1 S D 1 C T 1 Q N 
Appellant appeals fit oi it i tl i =; tt iial :oi n t's O, • t i i • Di smissin g Petition / hi Po st 
Conviction Relief ' ("Order"), filed on November 24, 2008, denying his Petition for Relief 
Under the ; ww-c "nnviction Remedies Act and a Memorandum in Support of A u\n>h for 
v
- • "'  Coi i i /" ztion ii't <'"i 
"Petition") in this case involving his convictions in the Seventh Judicial District Court 
for tlle County of Grand, State of Utah, for five (5) coimts of Dealing in Material Harmful 
Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OR REVIEW 
ISSU .Jid the trial court abuse its discretion iti f L t \ tug OH irrelevant 
circumstances that it inappropriately deemed as aggravatim? circumstances 
in sentencing Kissell? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court "traditionally afford[s] the trial court wide 
latitude and discretion in sentencing." State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah, 
1997). "An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial court if the 
sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the trial judge fails to consider all legally 
relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law." State 
v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989), citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1978), State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989), and State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 
987, 988 (Utah 1986). "A court abuses its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences 
only if no reasonable person would take the view by the sentencing court." State v. 
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 84 P.3d 854. "A trial court abuses its discretion in 
sentencing when, among other things, it fails to consider all legally relevant factors." 
State v. Helms. 2002 UT 12, ^|8, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting Gibbons, 779 P.2d at 1135). A 
failure to exercise discretion is generally encompassed within the meaning of abuse of 
discretion. See United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.1983) ("[A]s a general 
rule, the existence of discretion requires its exercise."); People v. Darlington, 105 P.3d 
230, 232 (Colo.2005) ("[F]ailure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion."). 
ISSUE #3: Did the trial court violate Kissell 's due process and equal protection rights 
in giving him consecutive sentences? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Due process challenges are questions of law that we 
review applying a correction of error standard." Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Com'n, 
2008 UT App 293, 1J9, 191 P.3d 1252, citing Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 
2001 UT App 370, ^17, 38 P.3d 969. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE, 
On August 27, 2004, Appellant, Michael William Kissell (hereinafter "Kissell"), 
was charged by Information in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Grand 
County, State of Utah, with forcible sexual abuse, a second-degree felony; thirty-four 
(34) counts of dealing in harmful material, all third-degree felonies under UT. CODE ANN. 
§76-10-1206, allowing for a separate charge for each article allegedly exhibited; and 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class B misdemeanor. R0013-R0014. On 
November 8, 2004, Kissell was charged by Amended Information with forcible sexual 
abuse, a second-degree felony; thirty-four (34) counts of dealing in harmful material to a 
minor, all third-degree felonies; and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class B 
misdemeanor. R0014. 
On March 1, 2005, Kissell filed his Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty 
Plea and Certificate of Counsel, pleading guilty to five (5) separate counts of dealing in 
harmful material to a minor pursuant to a plea agreement with the State of Utah 
("State"), with the remainder of the charges dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations. Id. 
On April 5, 2005, the trial court sentenced Kissell to five (5) zero-to-five (0-5) year terms 
to be served consecutively in the Utah State Prison, and entered its Judgment and 
Commitment to Utah State Prison (the "Judgment") in this matter. R0029. 
On July 14, 2006, Kissell filed a Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act and a Memorandum in Support of Petition for Relief Under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, challenging that the trial court had relied upon irrelevant and 
unreliable evidence and information in sentencing Appellant to consecutive terms. 
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R0005 and R0013. On October 20, 2006, the trial court entered its Order denying 
Kissell's Petition. R0032- R0033. On November 8, 2006, Kissell, timely filed his Notice 
of Appeal from the Order denying the Petition. R003 5. 
On June 8, 2007, Kissell filed his Brief of Appellant. The Utah Court of Appeals 
remanded the appeal, directing the trial court to order the State to respond to the Petition. 
On January 21, 2008, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief and Supporting Memorandum (the "Motion to Dismiss") (R0060-R0163). On 
March 26, 2008, Kissell filed his Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief and Supporting Memorandum R0164-0179 and, on April 18, 
2008, the State filed its State's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief R0180-0186. 
On November 7, 2008 the State filed its Notice to Submit State's Motion to 
Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief R0186-0188. On November 24, 2008, the 
Court filed the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief which is at issue in 
the current appeal. R0189-192 On December 17, 2008, Kissell timely filed his Notice of 
Appeal R0193. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 8, 2004, Kissell was charged by Amended Information with forcible 
sexual abuse, a second-degree felony; thirty-four (34) counts of dealing in harmful 
material to a minor, all third-degree felonies; and contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor, a class B misdemeanor. R0014. On March 1, 2005, Kissell filed his Statement of 
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel, pleading guilty to five 
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(5) separate counts of dealing in harmful material to a minor pursuant to a plea agreement 
with the State, with the remainder of the charges dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations. 
Id. 
On April 5, 2005, Kissell appeared for sentencing before the Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah. 
At sentencing, Kissell was remorseful and apologized to the victim's family for what he 
had done. Evidence was presented that Kissell had minimal prior criminal history, the 
crimes committed were non-violent crimes, and he had appeared at all scheduled hearings 
in this matter. Additionally, Kissell had maintained employment and had been a 
productive member of the community. Many letters were written by his neighbors and 
friends in support of Kissell, which evidenced a good reputation and a great job history. 
The prosecution and defense counsel, as well as Adult Probation and Parole, who 
had prepared a pre-sentence investigation report, believed that Kissell should receive 
concurrent sentences. At the sentencing hearing, prior to entering the sentence, Judge 
Anderson set forth the following analysis of factors he used in determining Kissell's 
sentence: 
THE COURT: You're - you're bisexual, Mr. Kissell, ah, so you're 
aroused by the idea of sexual contact with people of either sex; ~ 
MR. KISSELL: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: —is that right? 
MR. KISSELL: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Ah, but you understand that, ah most heter— well, all 
heterosexuals, I think, prefer to be heterosexual, and - and probably a very 
substantial portion of those people who, ah, are attracted to persons of the 
same sex wish that were not the case because of they see the effect that it 
has on their own lives and on their own families. And it's still difficult, 
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even in America today, to fit in with the templates of family life. Ah, even 
as loose as they've become it's difficult for those people. 
And I—I hear it all the time, you know: 'Do you think I would choose to be 
this way? I must be born this way. No one would choose this,' so. 
And then there's this controversy. Ah, do we need to keep people who are 
attracted to persons of the same sex away from our children because they 
may try to recruit our children? 
And now you're a poster boy for those people who want to keep persons 
attracted to people of the same sex away from their children. You're a 
poster boy now for them, because you did exactly what everyone fears. 
I don't think the most open minded parents out there would choose a 
homosexual life over a heterosexual life for their children, ah, then - even if 
they, once confronted it, they're accepting and -loving and caring. So this 
is this is what bothers me about this the most is that, ah you're - you're not 
only got involved with someone who's underage, but it was in a way that's 
going to create and confuse - a very substantial likelihood of confused 
sexual identity for this person. 
Why am I? Why - why was I? 
And you used - using heterosexual images to stir up sexual desire, and then 
turning it to your own advantage. So I mean I - I think you have to 
understand why the Keoughs must be absolutely furious with you. 
MR. KISSELL: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ah, I'm going to give you a prison sentence here and I'm 
going to impose these terms consecutively to give the Board of Pardons the 
option of keeping you for as long as 25 years, if you - if you're 
stonewallin' on your treatment. 
I - I have a concern, if I give a concurrent - if I give concurrent sentences 
here, that you may reach a point where they're confronting you in your 
treatment and you decide to just bail out of the treatment and survive five 
years. I'm—I'm not gonna give you that option. So you're going to have 
to be very consecutive and, ah, if they're - if they're willing to actually 
hold your feet to the fire, ah, they'll - subject to the budget limitations that 
they have, I'm sure, I'm gonna give 'em all the discretion they need to 
make sure that you, ah - you not ever do this again. At least create the 
greatest likelihood of that. 
Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced 
Kissell to five (5) zero to five (0-5) year terms to be served consecutively in the Utah 
State Prison, and entered the Judgment in this matter. R0029. 
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On July 14, 2006, having exhausted all potential appellate remedies, Kissell filed a 
Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and a Memorandum in 
Support of Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act Act, challenging 
that the trial court had relied upon irrelevant and unreliable evidence and information in 
sentencing Appellant to consecutive terms, based on the above colloquy. R0005 and 
R0013. On October 20, 2006, the trial court entered its Order denying Kissell's Petition. 
R0032- R0033. On November 8, 2006, Kissell timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the 
Order denying the Petition. R0035. 
On June 8, 2007, Kissell filed his Brief of Appellant. The Utah Court of Appeals 
remanded the appeal, directing the trial court to order the State to respond to the Petition. 
On January 21, 2008, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief and Supporting Memorandum (the "Motion to Dismiss") R0060-R0163. On 
March 26, 2008, Kissell filed his Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief and Supporting Memorandum R0164-0179 and, on April 18, 
2008, the State filed its State's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief R0180-0186. 
On November 7, 2008 the State submitted its Notice to Submit State's Motion to 
Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief R0186-0188. On November 24, 2008, the 
Court filed the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief R0189-192 On 
December 17, 2008, Kissell timely filed his Notice of Appeal. R0193. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMEND. XIV 
7 
II. UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I § 7 
III. UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I § 24 
IV. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401 
V. UT. R. Civ. P. 65C 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Trial courts are afforded wide latitude and discretion in sentencing. State v. 
Moreno, 2005 UT App. 200, TJ8, 113 P.3d 992 citing State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, | 8 , 40 
P.3d 626 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Moreno states as follows: 
We will reverse only if we determine that a sentencing court has exceeded 
its permitted range of discretion, or, stated differently, if we determine that 
the trial court has "failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed 
a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 
454, 456 (Utah Ct.App.1993). Moreover, our decision is informed by the 
understanding that "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily 
reflects the personal judgment of the [trial] court and [we] can properly find 
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court." Id. (first and third alterations in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
Id. The instant matter presents a challenge in reverse of this Court's customary reviews 
on issues pertaining to abuse of discretion in ordering consecutive sentences. Rather than 
a failure to consider all legally relevant factors, the trial court in Kissell's case 
inappropriately considered nonrelevant factors with no legal basis, which are evidenced 
in the colloquy on the record and should not have had a bearing on his sentencing. It is 
clear that the trial court relied upon these inappropriate factors since it opted to deviate 
from the State's recommendation for concurrent sentences. While trial courts are 
afforded wide latitude and discretion at sentencing, trial courts must stay within the 
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permitted range of discretion. Moreno at ^8. A trial court must consider all legally 
relevant factors. Id. The trial court in this case exceeded its discretion by relying on 
factors that were not legally relevant. 
No other factors in aggravation supported the consecutive sentences given to 
Kissell, who had several mitigating factors in favor of the State's recommendations. 
Kissell did not require the trial court or the State to expend efforts in bringing him to trial, 
but instead pled guilty. Kissell evidenced remorse and apologized in open court to the 
victim and the victim's family for the crimes to which he pled, and placed himself at the 
mercy of the trial court; however, he received a sentence similar to what he may have 
received upon a guilty verdict at trial. The trial court in this matter exceeded its judicial 
discretion in ordering consecutive sentences and thus the matter should be remanded and 
Kissell afforded new sentencing in the matter. 
"A court abuses its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences only if no 
reasonable person would take the view by the sentencing court." State v. Thorkelson, 
2004 UT App 9, 84 P.3d 854. The "reasonable person" standard is addressed regularly in 
law pertaining to negligence and its defining of the term is assistive here. Under 57A 
Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 133 (May 2009), the writers commented on the standard as 
follows: 
In dealing with the problem of judging an individual's behavior against 
community standards, the law has made use of the standard of a 
hypothetical "reasonable person." Sometimes this person is called a 
reasonable person of ordinary prudence, or an ordinarily prudent person, or 
a person of average prudence, or a person of reasonable sense exercising 
reasonable care. It is evident that all such phrases are intended to mean 
9 
very much the same thing. The actor is required to do what this ideal 
individual would do in his or her place. 
Ibid., citing Restatement Second, Torts § 283, Comment c. The difficulty in applying the 
"reasonable person" standard to a judge's sentencing determination is that a judge is no 
ordinary person and is equipped with knowledge and experience far exceeding the 
general population in the realm of sentencing. A "reasonable person" from the general 
population may rely more on emotion for the crimes allegedly committed rather than the 
unbiased experienced stance our judges take in such matters. It would thus be incorrect 
to apply a typical "reasonable person" standard to a judge's determination in sentencing. 
Rather, a judge's determination should be reviewed on a "reasonable person standard," 
but only one which bases that reasonableness upon what an ordinarily prudent judge 
would do in the exercise of reasonable care, not a member of the general population. 
Finally, Kissell's due process and equal protection rights were violated in 
sentencing him consecutively. The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that the 
federal Equal Protection Clause embodies the general principle that "...persons similarly 
situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be 
treated as if their circumstances were the same." State ex. rel. Z.C., 2005 UT App 562, 
K8, 128 P.3d 561; U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 14; U.C.A. CONST.ART. I § 24. The Utah 
appellate courts have long recognized that "[concurrent sentences are favored over 
consecutive ones." State v. Perez, 52 P.3d 451, TJ43, 2002 UT App 211; see, State v. 
Gallt 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). In the instant matter, the sentencing violates 
Kissell's right to equal protection and due process since the trial court undertook an 
10 
irrelevant and unreliable colloquy respecting bisexual versus heterosexual lifestyles, 
attributing a greater degree of harm to the victim based upon Kissell's bisexual lifestyle 
preference. Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. Utah Code Annotated does not differentiate by 
degrees of punishment the differences in sexual preference or the sex of the victims, and 
to rely on such in sentencing was improper. Kissell should be afforded new sentencing in 
the matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DEVIATING 
FROM THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND RELYING ON 
IRRELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT IT INAPPROPRIATELY 
DEEMED AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN 
SENTENCING KISSELL. 
A. The "Reasonable Person Standard" Applied to Sentencing 
Determinations Requires Amendment. 
Trial courts are afforded wide latitude and discretion in sentencing. State v. 
Moreno, 2005 UT App. 200, ^8, 113 P.3d 992 citing State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,1[8, 40 
P.3d 626 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Moreno states as follows: 
We will reverse only if we determine that a sentencing court has exceeded 
its permitted range of discretion, or, stated differently, if we determine that 
the trial court has "failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed 
a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 
454, 456 (Utah Ct.App.1993). Moreover, our decision is informed by the 
understanding that "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily 
reflects the personal judgment of the [trial] court and [we] can properly find 
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court." Id. (first and third alterations in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
Id. "A court abuses its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences only if no 
reasonable person would take the view by the sentencing court." State v. Thorkelson, 
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2004 UT App 9, 84 P.3d 854. However, this typical "reasonable person" standard as 
regularly applied in the law requires amendment when such standard is applied to a 
judge's decision. 
The "reasonable person" standard is addressed regularly in law pertaining to 
negligence and a look to its definition of the term is assistive here. Under 57A Am.Jur.2d 
Negligence § 133 (May 2009), the writers commented on the standard as follows: 
In dealing with the problem of judging an individual's behavior against 
community standards, the law has made use of the standard of a 
hypothetical "reasonable person." Sometimes this person is called a 
reasonable person of ordinary prudence, or an ordinarily prudent person, or 
a person of average prudence, or a person of reasonable sense exercising 
reasonable care. It is evident that all such phrases are intended to mean 
very much the same thing. The actor is required to do what this ideal 
individual would do in his or her place. 
Ibid., citing Restatement Second, Torts § 283, Comment c. The difficulty in applying the 
"reasonable person" standard to a judge's sentencing determination is that a judge is no 
ordinary person and is equipped with knowledge and experience far exceeding the 
general population in the realm of sentencing. A "reasonable person" from the general 
population may rely more on emotion for the crimes allegedly committed rather than the 
unbiased and experienced stance our judges take in such matters. It would thus be 
incorrect to apply a typical "reasonable person" standard to a judge's determination in 
sentencing. Rather, a judge's determination should be reviewed on a "reasonable person 
standard," but only one which bases that reasonableness upon what an ordinarily prudent 
judge would do in the exercise of reasonable care, not a member of the general 
population. 
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Tracing the history of this "reasonable person" standard in Thorkelson and 
Moreno supports this differing standard. Thorkelson relies upon a case determined nearly 
thirty (30) years ago by our Utah Supreme Court titled State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 
(Utah 1978). Moreno traces to State v. Nuttall 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App 1993), 
which, in turn, relies upon Gerrard. In Gerrard, a challenge was made that the trial 
court's sentence was based on an unreasonable interpretation of circumstances that 
existed at the prior hearings. The Gerrard court turned to the Wyoming case ofHicklin v. 
State, 535 P.2d 743 (Wyo. 1975), to adopt the "reasonable person" standard here in Utah 
for sentencing matters; however, important language from Hicklin was lost throughout 
the years. Hicklin was quoted in Gerrard as follows: 
. . .a judgment in a criminal case will not be disturbed because of 
sentencing procedures unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion, 
procedural conduct prejudicial to defendant, circumstances which manifest 
inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense 
of fair play... 
Gerrard at 887, citing Hicklin at 751. Gerrard also turned to a Washington case, State v. 
Harris, 10 Wash.App. 509, 518 P.2d 237 (1974), to indicate that "...the exercise of 
discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the 
appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable man 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard at 887, citing Harris, ibid. 
In tracing the history of the "reasonable person" standard applied in reviewing 
sentencing determinations, Harris relied upon State v. Hurst, 5 Wash.App. 146, 486 P.2d 
1136 (Wash. App. 1971), which relied upon Rehak v. Rehak, 1 Wash.App. 963, 965, 435 
P.2d 687 (1970), which interestingly is a divorce case. In Rehak, the Washington 
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appellate court noted that a "...judge does not have unfettered freedom to exercise his 
personal judgment and may exercise his discretion only within certain broad guidelines." 
This holding in Rehak was later overturned by the same appellate court in Coggle v. 
Snow, 56 Wash.App. 499, 784 P.2d 554 (Wash.App. 1990), which stated that the 
standard applied in Rehak for the exercise of judicial discretion was "imprudent." The 
Coggle court noted that the Rehak court adopted a test from Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., 
124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942), which stated that discretion was abused "when the 
judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable" which the Coggle court recognized 
as another way of saying that "discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would 
take the view adopted by the trial court" (emphasis in the original), noting that "[i]f 
reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then 
it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion." Coggle at 559. 
The Coggle court found this purported standard of abuse of discretion as one that 
could not be applied and undertook an extensive analysis assistive of the current matter. 
Id. Coggle5s analysis is as follows: 
Instead of examining the reasons for the decision, this standard focuses on 
the reasonableness of the decision-maker. But to say that an abuse of 
discretion exists when "no reasonable man, woman or judge" would have 
taken the view adopted by the trial court is not accurate. It cannot justly be 
said that every trial judge reversed by the appellate court or Supreme Court 
for an abuse of discretion is less reasonable than the reversing judges. "An 
experienced and reasonable trial judge does not suddenly become 
'unreasonable' on a particular day." State v. Creekmore, 55 Wash.App. 
852, 875, 783 P.3d 1068 (1989)(Forrest, J., concurring). Strict application 
of such a standard would mean that an appellate court would never reverse 
without a hearing to determine the general reasonableness of the judge. 
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In State ex. rel Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash.2d 12, 482 P.2d 775 (1971), the 
Supreme Court sought to temper the "reasonable man" standard: 
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among 
which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.... Where the decision or order of the trial court 
is a matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on review 
except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, 
discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable 
grounds, or for untenable reasons. 
Junker at 26, 482 P.2d 775. Nevertheless, numerous decisions since 1971 
have persisted in applying the Delno-Rehak standard, sometimes 
juxtaposing it with the Junker standard. E.g. Singleton v. Frost, 108 
Wash.2d 723, 730, 742 P.2d 1224 (1987). We take this occasion to 
disapprove the Delno-Rehak standard. The proper standard is whether 
discretion is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, 
considering the purposes of the trial court's discretion. 
Ibid, at 506-507. 
According to Merriam-Webster online, the word "untenable" means "not able to 
be defended." http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/untenable (May 28, 2009). 
The Cambridge Dictionary online defines "untenable" as an adjective that "describes a 
theory or argument that cannot be supported or defended against criticism" or "describes 
a situation that cannot continue as it is." http://dictionary.cambridge.org (May 28, 2009). 
Under YourDictionary.com, the term "untenable" is defined as "that cannot be held, 
defended or maintained" setting forth synonyms as "indefensible, unsupportable, 
unreasonable, unsound, flawed; see also illogical." 
http://www.yourdictionarv.com/untenable (May 28, 2009). 
The standard in Gerrard has been applied for nearly thirty (30) years in Utah, with 
our appellate courts relying on its precepts for determination of cases not selected for 
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publication. However, the history of such standard evidences that it was overturned by 
the originating court nearly nineteen (19) years ago in favor of a standard which did not 
require a look to the reasonableness of the judge on a regular person standard, but rather 
his actions in exercising the discretion given him. As stated by the Washington appellate 
courts on review of its own standard, it determined that "[t]he proper standard is whether 
discretion is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, considering the 
purposes of the trial court's discretion." Coggle at 507. It is not whether the judge's 
determination itself is untenable, but rather whether the grounds or reasoning upon which 
he relied were untenable. 
Coggle also suggests a consideration of the purpose behind the trial court's 
discretion. The purpose of the judge's discretion in sentencing is based uponhis expertise 
and experience in sentencing individuals regularly brought before the court. This Court 
has granted the trial courts wide latitude in sentencing for this purpose, recognizing that 
these sentencing decisions reflect the personal judgments of the trial court itself. Moreno 
at ^8. However, if a decision is based upon grounds or reasons that are untenable, or 
indefensible, unsupportable, unreasonable, unsound, flawed, or illogical, then it deprives 
the defendant of the ability to obtain adequate review of such determination. 
This Court should thus apply the standard as set forth in Coggle to its review of 
this matter, effectively overturning the Utah Supreme Court's prior decision in Gerrard, 
and its progeny, to adequately address the challenges in this matter. If this Court is 
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without the ability to do so , Kissell respectfully requests that the matter be certified to 
the Utah Supreme Court for determination. The necessity of doing so is evidenced in 
Kissell's challenges set forth more particularly below. 
B. The Trial Court Relied Upon Untenable Grounds and Reasons When 
Sentencing Kissell to Consecutive Sentences. 
This Court has determined, "[t]he trial court is charged with identifying, on the 
record, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that affect its sentencing decision, 
because '[sentencing should be conducted with full information and with careful 
deliberation of all relevant factors.'" Id. at ]flO citing State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 
1300 (Utah 1993). This Court has also determined, "...in the absence of any express 
findings regarding proffered mitigating or aggravating circumstances, we will conclude 
that the trial court, by implication, found that the proffered circumstances did not amount 
to circumstances in aggravation or mitigation[.]" State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App. 103, 
1J27, 132 P.3d 703 citing Moreno at If 18. 
At sentencing in the instant matter, the following statements were recorded on the 
record: 
THE COURT: You're - you're bisexual, Mr. Kissell, ah, so you're 
aroused by the idea of sexual contact with people of either sex; — 
MR. KISSELL. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: —is that right? 
MR. KISSELL: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Ah, but you understand that, ah most heter- -- well, all 
heterosexuals, I think, prefer to be heterosexual, and - and probably a very 
substantial portion of those people who, ah, are attracted to persons of the 
same sex wish that were not the case because of they see the effect that it 
There is some question as to whether certification is necessary since the Utah Court of Appeals did not exist when 
Gerrard was entered, so the Utah Supreme Court sat as the first and only level reviewing court for Gerrard in the 
State of Utah at the time. 
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has on their own lives and on their own families. And it's still difficult, 
even in America today, to fit in with the templates of family life. Ah, even 
as loose as they've become it's difficult for those people. 
And I—I hear it all the time, you know: 'Do you think I would choose to be 
this way? I must be born this way. No one would choose this,' so. 
And then there's this controversy. Ah, do we need to keep people who are 
attracted to persons of the same sex away from our children because they 
may try to recruit our children? 
And now you're a poster boy for those people who want to keep persons 
attracted to people of the same sex away from their children. You're a 
poster boy now for them, because you did exactly what everyone fears. 
I don't think the most open minded parents out there would choose a 
homosexual life over a heterosexual life for their children, ah, then - even if 
they, once confronted it, they're accepting and -loving and caring. So this 
is this is what bothers me about this the most is that, ah you're - you're not 
only got involved with someone who's underage, but it was in a way that's 
going to create and confuse - a very substantial likelihood of confused 
sexual identity for this person. 
Why am I? Why - why was I? 
And you used - using heterosexual images to stir up sexual desire, and then 
turning it to your own advantage. So I mean I - I think you have to 
understand why the Keoughs must be absolutely furious with you. 
MR. KISSELL: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ah, I'm going to give you a prison sentence here and I'm 
going to impose these terms consecutively to give the Board of Pardons the 
option of keeping you for as long as 25 years, if you - if you're 
stonewallin' on your treatment. 
I - I have a concern, if I give a concurrent - if I give concurrent sentences 
here, that you may reach a point where they're confronting you in your 
treatment and you decide to just bail out of the treatment and survive five 
years. I'm—I'm not gonna give you that option. So you're going to have 
to be very consecutive and, ah, if they're - if they're willing to actually 
hold your feet to the fire, ah, they'll - subject to the budget limitations that 
they have, I'm sure, I'm gonna give 6em all the discretion they need to 
make sure that you, ah - you not ever do this again. At least create the 
greatest likelihood of that. 
Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced 
Kissell to five (5) zero to five (0-5) year terms to be served consecutively in the Utah 
State Prison, and entered the Judgment in this matter. R0029. 
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Kissell did not file a direct appeal from the Judgment; however, he did file the 
Petition at issue herein, which argued the sentence was improper in that it was based 
upon irrelevant and unreliable evidence and violated his right to equal protection. The 
trial court simply denied the Petition without response from the State. Kissell thus 
appealed the denial and this Court remanded with direction to the State to respond to the 
Petition. After the State's Motion to Dismiss and Kissell's response thereto, the trial court 
dismissed the Petition. Kissell thus filed his Notice of Appeal from the dismissal of the 
Petition. 
While trial courts are afforded wide latitude and discretion at sentencing, trial 
courts must stay within the permitted range of discretion. Moreno at ^8. A trial court 
must consider all legally relevant factors. Id. As argued supra, "[t]he proper standard is 
whether discretion is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, 
considering the purposes of the trial court's discretion." Coggle at 507. The trial court in 
this case exceeded its discretion by relying on factors that were not legally relevant and 
thus deprived Kissell of the ability to defend against them. The trial court relied on 
Kissell's bisexual tendencies and their affect upon the victim to impose consecutive 
sentences. While the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal 
judgment of the trial court, to rely on these tendencies as a factor to impose consecutive 
sentences is inappropriate. Id. Such grounds or reasoning was untenable and thus 
improper on which to base a sentence. 
The sentencing in this case was not conducted with careful deliberation of all 
relevant factors. This Court must assume that, in light of the lack of express findings 
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regarded aggravating circumstances, the circumstances did not amount to circumstances 
in aggravation. Malaga at [^27. The trial court erred in denying the Petition, which 
challenges the sentencing in this matter as relying on improper and unreliable factors; 
hence, the circumstances leading to the sentencing are pertinent in this matter. 
As further support, Kissell pled guilty and subjected himself to the mercy of the 
court, only to receive the harshest sentence within the trial court's discretion. In State v. 
Patience, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
"[t]he nature of plea bargains requires the exchange of consideration, 
allowing the parties involved to reach a mutually desirable agreement. A 
plea bargain is a contractual relationship in which consideration is passed." 
Id. The court continued by stating: "A plea bargain does not involve a 
situation where a defendant willingly pleads guilty to a crime, neither 
asking nor expecting anything in return." Id. 
Ibid., 944 P.2d 381, 386 (Utah App,1997)(Emphasis added), citing State v. West, 765 
P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988). "It would be ... implausible to assume that defendant would 
have bargained to plead guilty expecting nothing in return." Patience at 386, citing West 
at 896. 
In the instant matter, Kissell entered a guilty plea to five (5) counts of Dealing in 
Harmful Material to a Minor, third degree felonies, and was sentenced to five (5) zero-to-
five year terms to run consecutively. Although it is within the trial court's discretion to a 
sentence a defendant as they deem fit and they do not have to abide by the 
recommendations of the State, Kissell anticipated that by pleading guilty the court would 
show some mercy, particularly given his limited criminal history and his evident remorse 
for the victim and the victim's family. The entire purpose of a plea agreement is that, by 
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admitting culpability and taking responsibility for the crime, the court would exercise 
mercy on a defendant. "...[Ajfter initial charges have been filed, the vast majority of 
courts permit, encourage, or require some degree of judicial discretion in accepting or 
rejecting such arrangements." State v. Montiel 2005 UT 48, |12, 122 P.3d 571. In the 
criminal system, defendants are encouraged to plead by the idea that a court will likely be 
merciful in its sentencing since they avoid the time, efforts, energy and costs involved in 
bringing the matter to trial. Additionally, a plea is a factor in mitigation based on 
acceptance of one's responsibility in the matter, and should be taken into consideration 
when determining what sentence should be given. However, the trial court in this matter 
exercised no mercy but gave Kissell what amounts to the harshest sentence within its 
discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined, "[w]e generally adhere to the 
proposition that, subject to constitutional constraints, '[t]he Executive remains the 
absolute judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and 
presumptively best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated.'" Id. at 
Tfl2 citing United States v. Cowan. 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir.1975); see United States v. 
Armstrong. 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996). Montiel 
continues by stating that, "[p]lea bargains, however, implicate not only the ordinarily 
plenary executive power to indict or dismiss; they also 'go to the traditionally judicial 
function of determining what penalty to impose.'" Ibid., citing United States v. Escobar 
Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1981); see also United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 
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F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1997). However, trial courts may not reject a guilty plea 
arbitrarily. Id. at f^ 14 ("courts should be wary of second-guessing prosecutorial choices"). 
In the instant matter, the trial court deviated from the State's recommendation of 
concurrent sentences and instead imposed the sentences consecutively. While not 
challenged in this appeal, the purpose behind the plea bargain is necessary for this 
Court's understanding that, had Kissell proceeded to trial and been convicted, he would 
surely have expected a harsher sentence. Instead, in entering into a plea agreement with 
the State, he placed himself at the mercy of the trial court and received a sentence similar 
to what he may have received upon a guilty verdict at trial. This is further support for the 
fact that the trial court relied upon untenable grounds and reasons for imposing 
consecutive sentences. No circumstances in aggravation supported such determination. 
The State, subject to constitutional restraints, remains the absolute best judge of 
what penalties should be imposed through the exercise of their plea bargaining powers. 
Id. As such a judge, the State takes on the traditionally judicial function of recommending 
an appropriate sentence. Id. Such practice is permitted, encouraged, and requires some 
degree of judicial discretion in accepting or rejecting such arrangements. Id. The trial 
court should have exercised restraint and only deviated from the State's 
recommendations based upon appropriate grounds or reasoning. The Court in this matter 
clearly did not exercise such restraint, as evidenced by its inappropriate colloquy on the 
record in this matter. 
The trial court relied upon untenable grounds and reasons in its sentencing Kissell 
to consecutive terms in this matter. The trial court did not indicate on the record that the 
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information contained in the colloquy was a factor in aggravation, but it contained 
information that Kissell cannot adequately defend against since it has no legal basis and 
resulted in a sentence that is not outside the guidelines. It is clear from a reading of the 
colloquy that it implicates factors not standardly relied upon by sentencing courts and not 
commonly reviewed by appellate courts. The trial court was given the opportunity to 
overturn its prior sentence by the filing of the Petition in this matter, but chose not to do 
so. Kissell simply requests an opportunity for re-sentencing where untenable grounds 
and reasons are not relied upon during such sentencing. 
II. THE JUDGMENT VIOLATES APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that the federal Equal Protection 
Clause embodies the general principle that "...persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." State ex. rel. Z.C., 2005 UT App 562, ^|8, 128 P.3d 561; 
U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 14; U.C.A. CONST.ART. I § 24. The Utah appellate courts have 
long recognized that "[concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones." State v. 
Perez, 52 P.3d 451, |43, 2002 UT App 211; see, State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 
1998). UT. CODE ANN. §76-3-401 sets forth the following with respect to the trial 
court's authority to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences: 
A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall 
indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: (a) if the sentences 
imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and (b) if 
the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with 
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any other sentences the defendant is already serving. (2) In determining 
whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court 
shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of 
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
In State v. Wanosik, the Utah Court of Appeals held that, "[t]he due process clause 
of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a 
sentence." Ibid., 2001 UT App 241, |34, 31 P.3d 615, citing State v. Howell 707 P.2d 
115, 118 (Utah 1985). The Utah Court of Appeals has recognized that "...a criminal 
defendant's right to be sentenced based on relevant and reliable information regarding his 
crime, his background, and the interests of society stands independent of Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 22(a)." Wanosik, supra. "A sentence in a criminal case should be 
appropriate for the defendant in light of his background and the crime committed and also 
serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice system." Wanosik, 
citing State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). '"[T]he sentencing judge[ 
][has] discretion in determining what punishment fits both the crime and the offender,' 
but [the Utah appellate courts] have consistently sought 'to shore up the soundness and 
reliability of the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that 
sentencing discretion.'" Id, citing State v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980) 
(requiring disclosure of presentence report to defendant prior to sentencing). 
In the instant matter, the sentence imposed violates KisselPs right to equal 
protection and due process. Kissell was not treated as those who had been in a similar 
situation were. The trial court undertook an irrelevant and unreliable colloquy respecting 
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bisexual versus heterosexual lifestyles, attributing a greater degree of harm to the victim 
based upon KisselPs bisexual lifestyle preference. Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. The trial 
court reiterated this in the Order denying the Petition when it stated that it viewed the acts 
at issue herein with a greater degree of harm stating that, "[t]he victim of petitioner was 
of the same sex as petitioner, which has made the victim's trauma even greater and 
recovery more problematic." See, Addendum "A." While a judge is authorized and 
expected to undertake moral judgments in our society with respect to actions taken by 
individuals, those actions are typically attributable to crime and punishment on the basis 
that they are determined to be illegal or against the greater moral conscience by ruling of 
our legislative body in codifying such on our behalves. 
The trial court did not impose a sentence that was appropriate for Kissell in light 
of his background and the crime committed while also serving the interests of society. 
Wanosik at f34. Utah Code Annotated does not differentiate by degrees of punishment 
the differences in sexual preference or the sex of the victims, and to rely on such in 
sentencing was improper. While Kissell's actions with respect to the victim were 
codified as illegal based upon the age of the victim, Judge Anderson's colloquy clearly 
indicates that age was not the only determining factor in ordering consecutive sentences, 
evidencing possible partiality, prejudice, impropriety or ill will towards Kissell. Hence, 
the trial court in this matter exceeded its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence -
particularly since concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones - and in failing 
to rely on relevant evidence to support the sentence. Perez at |^43 and Wanosik at f34. 
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In Utah, there are many cases where the defendants were charged with the same 
crime to which Kissell pled guilty, but who received either lesser sentences or probation 
and a fine. In State v. Haltom, Haltom was found guilty of selling an adult video to 
minor and was convicted of dealing harmful material to a minor and sentenced to 0-5 
years, which sentence was suspended and he was ordered to serve thirty (30) days and 
probation. Ibid., 2005 UT App 348, 121 P.3d 42. In State v. Brown, the defendant was 
convicted of showing a pornographic video to a minor, and the trial court sentenced him 
to five years imprisonment and imposed a $5000.00 fine. 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App.,1993). 
The trial court in Brown's case then stayed the sentence, placing defendant on probation 
subject to his serving the fourteen (14) day minimum mandatory sentence and abiding by 
other probation conditions. Id. Another example is found in State v. Vigil, where Vigil 
was convicted of dealing harmful material to a minor and was fined $12,650 and 
sentenced to two terms of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison and one (1) year in the Davis 
County Jail to be served concurrently, (emphasis added);. 840 P.2d 788 (Utah 
App., 1992). 
It appears in Utah, that consecutive sentences are typically imposed only in 
situations where a violent crime accompanies the charge of dealing in harmful material to 
a minor. For example, in State v. Helms, the trial court sentenced Helms to three (3) 
years to life in prison for both counts of aggravated sexual assault and zero-to-five years 
in prison for each of the three (3) counts of dealing in harmful material to a child. Ibid., 
2002 UT 12, 40 P.3d 626. The Helms trial court ordered that Helms serve the five (5) 
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sentences consecutively, obviously based on the trial court's concern that Helms was a 
threat to the safety of the community. 
In the cases listed supra, Haltom, Vigil and Brown were either given concurrent 
sentences or put on probation for committing similar crimes to the ones at issue herein. 
Only in a violent crime situation such as Helms has a similar punishment been afforded 
to someone guilty of the crimes at issue herein. Kissell was unreasonably sentenced to up 
to (25) twenty-five years in prison for a crime that was non-violent when he did not have 
any previous criminal history and was apologetic and remorseful for what had occurred. 
Because Kissell had committed the same crime as the cases cited supra, but received 
excessive punishment for such, his equal protection rights have been violated. U.S.C.A. 
CONST.AMEND. 14; U.C.A. CONST.ART. I § 24. Kissell was sentenced more severely than 
those similarly situated to him. Z.C. at TJ8. 
Kissell's due process rights were violated because the trial court did not rely on 
evidence that was reliable or reasonable in making their decision to sentence Kissell to 
consecutive sentences. No evidence was presented at sentencing that showed that Kissell 
would "stonewall" on his rehabilitation and not be quickly and effectively rehabilitated. 
In fact, the opposite appears to be more accurate. Before even entering treatment, Kissell 
had shown that he was amendable to rehabilitation by his apology to the victim and the 
victim's family, his remorsefulness, and his cooperative behavior. Instead of receiving 
acknowledgment for the steps he had taken towards rehabilitation on his own, he was 
unjustly laden with a sentence that could keep him in prison for up to twenty-five (25) 
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years. This sentence was based upon an assumption that he would "stonewall" on his 
treatment and not be rehabilitated when no such character evidence was ever presented. 
The trial court also appears to have given Kissell consecutive sentences because of 
his admission that he was bisexual and the same-sex nature of the victim in the matter. 
This admission seems to have planted a seed in the court's mind that, because of these 
tendencies, Kissell would be harder to rehabilitate and may "stonewall" on his treatment, 
causing the court to feel that he possibly needed to be put away for a long period of time. 
Again, no evidence was presented to show that this was the case. It is clear that the intent 
behind UT. CODE ANN. §76-3-401 was to allow the trial court to utilize relevant and 
reliable information in sentencing, while recognizing that concurrent sentences are 
favored. See, Perez and GalH, supra. Kissell's due process rights were violated by 
failure to take into consideration relevant and reliable information in determining the 
sentence. In this case, the punishment does not fit the crime or the offender. See, 
Wanosik. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Kissell respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's denial of his Petition, set aside his current consecutive 
sentences, and remand this matter for more appropriate sentencing. 
DATED THIS 29th day of June, 2009. 
K. Andrew Fitzgerald 
Attorney for Michael William Kissell 
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL WILLIAM KISSELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants, 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 060700140 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
In accordance with direction from the Utah Court of Appeals, 
this court had the petition of Michael William Kissell 
("Kissell") served on the State of Utah (the "State"), with 
instructions that the State file a response. The State filed a 
Motion to Dismiss on February 25, 2008. Kissell filed his 
response on March 26, 2008. x The State filed its reply on 
April 18, 2008. On November 7, 2008, the State submitted its 
motion for decision. 
The State asserts that Kissell's petition must be dismissed 
because it is barred by Section 78-35a-107(1), Utah Code (2004). 
It is not disputed that the petition was filed more than one year 
after it accrued, which was May 5, 2005. The State also asserts 
1
 Kissell's response bore the number of the underlying criminal case and was initially 
filed in that case. 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION I 
1
 i inn ii nil i l l IIIII inn urn mil inn IIIII mil mi mi 
VD27493991 pages: 4 
060700140 STATE OF UTAH 
that the petition is procedurally barred because the claims 
raised in the petition could have been raised on appeal. There 
is no question that, had Kissell appealed his sentence, he could 
have raised every issue raised in this petition. 
Kissell first responds that the petition is not frivolous on 
its face. This court agrees that the mandate from the Utah Court 
of Appeals implicitly includes a determination that the petition 
is not frivolous on its face. However, that the petition is not 
frivolous on its face does not mean that it necessarily survives 
a motion to dismiss. 
The only argument asserted by Kissell with respect to the 
State's procedural defense is that Kissell did not know of his 
claim when the direct appeal could have been filed. However, the 
only support offered for this assertion is that Kissell didn't 
appeal. As the State notes, if this court accepted that 
assertion, no post conviction claim not raised on appeal could 
ever be procedurally barred. The law requires more than this, 
i.e. some showing that unusual circumstances justify allowing 
Kissell to pursue claims he could have raised on direct appeal. 
Because Kissell has offered no support for his claim that he did 
not know he could pursue his claims on direct appeal, this court 
is forced to determine that those claims are barred. 
2 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Kissell's petition is dismissed, 
No further order is required. 
Dated this 2C day of November, 2 008. 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Judge 
3 
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